

# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

## Monterey, California



## THESIS

**STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES  
AND THREATS ANALYSIS OF CONSOLIDATED  
SERVICES AT NAVAL AIR STATION JOINT RESERVE  
BASE FORT WORTH**

by

Jeffrey M. Post

March 2001

Principal Advisor:  
Associate Advisor:

Cary Simon  
Ira Lewis

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OF CONSOLIDATED SERVICES AT NAVAL AIR STATION JOINT RESERVE  
BASE FORT WORTH**

Jeffrey M. Post  
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve  
BBA, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1997


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
Author:

  
Jeffrey M. Post

Approved by:

  
Cary Simon, Principal Advisor

  
Ira Lewis, Associate Advisor

  
Reuben Harris, Dean  
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy

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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis analyzes the consolidation of U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Texas Air National Guard (TANG) support services at Naval Air Station (NAS) Joint Reserve Base (JRB) Fort Worth, Texas. Consolidation literature was reviewed and extensive field interviews were conducted with 11 military and civilian personnel involved in support service consolidation at NAS JRB Fort Worth.

A strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) assessment and interview results yielded the following conclusions: There is a lack of DOD direction concerning guidance and implementation of interservice support; consolidating support functions among the Services increases overall efficiency and improves performance; and cultural differences are evident among the Services, but the differences can be resolved.

Recommendations include increasing the priority of developing and promulgating joint policies and standardizing DOD instructions for generic functions. Additionally, Service leaders should include more interservice operability into their strategic and training plans, and analyze existing and potential cost savings.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AMC	Air Mobility Command
DOD	Department of Defense
DRI	Defense Reform Initiative
FORSCOM	Forces Command (Army)
GAO	General Accounting Office
JIRSG	Joint Interservice Regional Support Group
JRB	Joint Reserve Base
NAS	Naval Air Station
NPR	National Performance Reform
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
SELRES	Selected Reservist
SWOT	Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats
TANG	Texas Air National Guard
USARC	United States Army Reserve Command

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My heartfelt thanks goes to Ira Lewis for pointing me in the right direction and Cary Simon, for his tremendous effort in the development of this thesis. Last, but not least, I am grateful for the support of my wife, Susie, my Son, Peter, and daughter, Brittany.

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

### **A. BACKGROUND**

The shrinking defense budget throughout the 1990s required the Department of Defense (DOD) to become more efficient in the allocation of resources. The U.S. military is involved in an ongoing effort to get the most from their budget without eroding readiness. Consolidation of common support services among the four Services could save substantial dollars, and is the topic of this thesis.

### **B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE**

Consolidating support services in Multi-Service geographical areas has the potential to help DOD become more efficient in utilizing resources by reducing the redundancy of support services performed by the military.

The consolidation of support services also has the potential to make the Services more effective in carrying out missions. This thesis is a case study of Naval Air Station (NAS) Joint Reserve Base (JRB) Fort Worth, examining the efficiency and effectiveness surrounding the consolidation of base support services, i.e., services to support the embarked reserve and active duty personnel.

### **C. METHODOLOGY**

The method of analysis is literature review of interservice support and extensive field interviews of 11 military and civilian personnel involved in support service consolidation at NAS JRB Fort Worth. The interviewees were six Naval officers, four Naval enlisted personnel, two Texas Air National Guard (TANG) enlisted personnel and two civilian managers. Questions were drawn from the question bank in Appendix L.

A strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis was part of the interview format. The purpose of the SWOT was to conduct an exploratory assessment of the external and internal working environment at NAS JRB Fort Worth based on the perceptions of the participants.<sup>1</sup> The SWOT analysis can provide a broad overview of an organizations environment, and provides a framework for analyzing interview comments.<sup>2</sup>

A longer-term strategic objective of the SWOT analysis is to build on strengths and take advantage of the opportunities while confronting the weaknesses and minimizing the threats.<sup>3</sup>

The conclusions of this thesis were based on the NAS JRB Fort Worth SWOT analysis and interviews. The recommendations are submitted for the possible assistance to other military and civilian leaders involved in consolidation initiatives.

#### **D. BENEFIT OF STUDY**

This thesis analyzes the consolidation of U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Texas Air National Guard (TANG) support services at NAS JRB Fort Worth. The objective of the study was to examine the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats concerning consolidation of support services and to draw conclusions and make recommendations, which may be applicable to other joint service situations.

The benefit of this thesis is to assist DOD managers in consolidation initiatives by providing a synoptic assessment of consolidated activities at one base. All Services are

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<sup>1</sup> Thompson/Strickland, 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Thompson/Strickland, 2001.

<sup>3</sup> Bryson, 1995.

struggling to increase and enhance interservice operability. The challenges are complex due primarily to 50 years of mostly independent Service development and operations. The conclusions and recommendations should assist leaders and managers to better understand consolidation initiatives, particularly from the perspective of various practitioners.



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## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

### A. BACKGROUND

Every soldier must take the battlefield believing his or her unit is the best in the world. Every pilot must take off believing there is no one better in the sky. Every sailor standing watch must believe there is no better ship at sea. Every marine must hit the beach believing there are no better infantrymen in the world. But they all must also believe that they are part of a team, a joint team, that fights together to win. This is our history, this is our tradition, this is our future.<sup>4</sup>

General Colin Powell, then Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as quoted above, saw jointness as the wave of the future for the Armed Forces.

The law that paved the way for the Services to fundamentally increase joint interoperability was the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986. The basic premise of the law was to reorganize and strengthen the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provide for a more efficient and effective operation of the armed forces.<sup>5</sup> The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act has made joint operations, joint education, and joint systems a fact-of-life in today's military environment.<sup>6</sup>

"One of the landmark laws of American history." is how Congressman and later Secretary of Defense Les Aspin described the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act. Speaking as the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in 1986, Aspin added, "This law is probably the greatest sea change in the history of the American

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<sup>4</sup> Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1997.

<sup>5</sup> Congressional Quarterly, 1986.

<sup>6</sup> Wilson, PG.

military since the Continental Congress created the Continental Army in 1775.”<sup>7</sup> Congressman Aspin was enthusiastic about the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Although the Act does not directly organize joint support service consolidation, it does require a more efficient use of resources. In fact, of the eight general provisions, the sixth provision is to “Provide for the more efficient use of defense resources.”<sup>8</sup> The consolidation of base support functions among Services where feasible definitely supports the intent of Goldwater-Nichols.

The policy for interservice support was established in the DOD instruction 4000.19 of August 1995. It states that:

DOD activities shall provide requested support to other DOD activities when the head of the requesting activity determines it would be in the best interest of the United States Government, and the head of the supplying activity determines capabilities exist to provide the support without jeopardizing assigned missions. DOD activities may request support from other DOD activities when in-house capabilities do not exist, or when support can be obtained more efficiently or effectively from other existing DOD capabilities.<sup>9</sup>

Studies have been conducted on the Consolidation of support services of different military branches that are in the same geographic area. In a report to Congress the General Accounting Office (GAO) stated the following:

Our analysis of the Service’s operations and maintenance (O&M) budgets indicate that a significant portion of these budgets are spent on maintaining facilities and delivering services to installations.

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<sup>7</sup> JFQ, PG 10.

<sup>8</sup> JFQ, PG 11.

<sup>9</sup> Department of Defense Instruction 4000.19/Aug 95, PG 2.

DOD has long been concerned about and has sought ways to reduce the cost of military base support, and DOD believes that greater economies and savings could be achieved by consolidating and eliminating duplicate support services for military bases located close to one another, or where similar functions are performed at multiple locations.<sup>10</sup>

The GAO has estimated that the DOD spends about one-third of its O&M budget on support services. These estimates are for direct base support activities. When all functions that directly support the warfighter are included, the percentage increases substantially. The Defense Science Board concluded in a 1996 report that military support operations actually account for fifty-five percent of the defense budget.<sup>11</sup>

For years, DOD senior leadership have realized there is a major potential for savings through the elimination of redundancy by consolidating base support services. In a 1997 address the Secretary of Defense made the following statement:

Regional planning and interservice support between the military departments, defense agencies, and other federal agencies are becoming increasingly important. As major military bases are closed, new efficient sources of support must be found for defense activities at remaining bases, and new methods must be sought for reducing the cost of base support services.<sup>12</sup>

Unfortunately, despite the recognized potential for savings from interservicing support services, dissimilar traditions and cultures among the military branches and their fear of losing control of direct support assets have hampered a full scale consolidation of support services.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 1.

<sup>11</sup> Wilson, PG 1.

<sup>12</sup> Executive Secretary Address, 1997.

<sup>13</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 3.

There is clear potential for savings but it is hard to document how much money could be saved from interservice support activities. The extent of savings from consolidating support services is not clear because some consolidations that were supposed to be the benchmark for the measure of projected savings were either not implemented, not implemented as planned, or terminated.<sup>14</sup> The GAO also reported that:

DOD and the services found it manpower intensive and often difficult to differentiate savings from cost avoidances; consequently, DOD does not devote significant efforts to tracking savings from projects implemented.<sup>15</sup>

It is hard to convince people that a program will save money if there is no supporting documentation. However, DOD officials have provided some informal figures that estimate multimillion-dollar savings spread over many years from the consolidation of certain support functions.

## **B. CONSOLIDATION EFFORTS**

In 1972, DOD established the Defense Regional Interservice Support program to help identify and abolish redundant base support services for activities sharing the same geographical area.<sup>16</sup>

In 1978 DOD created the Joint Interservice Resource Study Groups (JIRSG) to evaluate the feasibility of savings that could be realized by consolidating support services in geographical areas where several major military installations were within a fifty-mile

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<sup>14</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 3.

<sup>15</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 3.

<sup>16</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 4.

proximity to each other. Studies were done by JIRSGs between 1978 and 1992 identifying ways to reduce costs by consolidating support services.

In 1992, DOD altered the JIRSG program so that its emphasis changed from conducting regional studies to providing interservice support.<sup>17</sup> JIRSGs became Joint Integrated "Regional Support Groups" vice "Resource Study Groups". The revised function of the JIRSGs is to investigate the viability of ideas for enhancing quality, efficiency, and effectiveness by encouraging and assisting interaction and collaboration among DOD activities.<sup>18</sup>

Joint Interservice Regional Support Groups have been established in geographical regions with multiple defense activities to identify and facilitate realignment of support missions to the most efficient and effective sources in each region, regardless of which DOD or federal agency currently provides support.<sup>19</sup>

A JIRSG can be helpful in recognizing where interagency, interservice and intraservice support agreements may be needed.

Working in conjunction with activity Support Agreement Managers, many JIRSGs have developed master support matrices that identify available support and capabilities, potential suppliers, receivers, mission statements, and points of contact within the region. The benefits of the matrix are invaluable. In one JIRSG region for example, over \$6 million in military training costs were saved by matching potential suppliers and receivers, and in another, the matrix was used to prepare for mobilization contingencies and base support plans.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 4-5.

<sup>18</sup> Lane PG 1.

<sup>19</sup> Executive Secretary Address, 1997.

<sup>20</sup> Lane PG 2.

In the Colorado Springs area, Fort Carson and other military installations have made noteworthy advances in service delivery and operational performance through ideas put into practice under JIRSG.<sup>21</sup>

The JIRSG coordinator at Fort Carson made the following statement about the program:

The JIRSG is a partnership program for area installations to explore opportunities for economies and efficiencies in numerous functional areas. Installations seek opportunities to leverage their collective capabilities and enter joint initiatives with one installation designated as the sponsor in a particular area. Actions implemented must maintain existing or improve levels of service.<sup>22</sup>

Fort Carson is in charge of the civil engineering, law enforcement, and education/training. One example of how much money is being saved is in the refuse management area. The improvements in the refuse management operations have saved each of the three participating services about \$70,000 per year.<sup>23</sup>

In the regions contacted by GAO in 1996, there were interservice agreements in morale, welfare and recreation, laundry, and utilities. Most of them were limited in scope, in that they were pertaining to portions of the functions rather than large-scale reliance on one activity to perform all the functions for multiple DOD installations. There are many interservice agreements for the consolidation of support services in place but there are many more opportunities that are being overlooked.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> DOD Business Systems Principles Web site, DEC 2000.

<sup>22</sup> DOD Business Systems Principles Web site.

<sup>23</sup> DOD Business Systems Principles Web site.

<sup>24</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 5-6.

### C. OUTSOURCING AS AN OPTION

Another option that DOD is undertaking to save money on the operation of support services is outsourcing. The emphasis on outsourcing is greater today than in the past due to the Clinton Administration's National Performance Review and the ongoing Defense Reform Initiative, including outsourcing recommendations from two DOD study groups.<sup>25</sup>

The 1993 National Performance Review stated that there should be greater consideration of options in obtaining support services and no agency should use in-house support unless it was competitive with private companies.<sup>26</sup>

In 1995, the report of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that all commercial activities in DOD be outsourced, and that all the new needs be channeled through the private sector.<sup>27</sup>

Activities that were not dependent on specialized, defense-unique equipment such as base security, facilities and maintenance, and installation management services, were designated as prime candidates for early outsourcing.<sup>28</sup>

The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) further called for DOD to decrease its support infrastructure and develop ways to make its business practices more efficient.

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<sup>25</sup> May 1995 Roles and Missions study and the October 1995 Defense Science Board Study on Quality of Life.

<sup>26</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 6.

<sup>27</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 6.

<sup>28</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 6.



The Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) was a follow-on to the 1997 QDR and is built around the following four major ideas:

- Reengineering defense business processes and support functions primarily by adopting and applying private sector best practices
- Reorganizing and reducing the size of DOD headquarters elements and defense agencies, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Expanding the use of competitive sourcing to open DOD's commercial activities to competition from the private sector
- Conducting two additional base realignment and closure (BRAC) rounds and eliminating other facilities that are no longer needed and/or that drain resources.<sup>29</sup>

DOD officials are convinced that these major initiatives will reduce infrastructure costs; the majority of the savings projected to come from future BRACs and competitive sourcing.<sup>30</sup>

There have been outsourcing studies using methodologies established by OMB Circular A-76 done at over 200 locations to evaluate whether it would be more efficient to outsource or retain base support functions.

The goal of an A-76 process is to increase efficiency and save dollars by forcing government activities to compete with the private sector. As part of the A-76 study, the in-house workforce is given the opportunity to restructure their procedures prior to being competed against by private sector companies. The in-house operations usually prove more advantageous to the government about fifty percent of the time.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> GAO/T-NSIAD-99-95, PG 3.

<sup>30</sup> GAO/T-NSIAD-99-95, PG 3.

<sup>31</sup> Wilson, PG 6.

Suzanne H. Wilson, an Army GS-14, argues that outsourcing base support operations may not be the solution. She notes that since about half of the time the in-house support service departments prove to be more efficient than outsourcing, "The military services need to ensure that we don't 'jump the gun' and automatically assume that outsourcing provides the best quality at the lowest cost."<sup>32</sup>

#### **D. INDIVIDUAL SERVICE APPROACHES**

##### **1. Army**

The Army has been aggressive in the pursuit of interservice support operations. The Army's major commands in the United States have been given the lead in examining all options for obtaining greater efficiency in base support operations. Forces Command (FORSCOM) has examined several initiatives to achieve greater efficiency.

One of the programs is known as Installation XXI. Under this initiative, the three garrison commanders at I, II, and XVIII Airborne Corps, and the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) have been tasked with exploring new options for more efficient base support operations.<sup>33</sup> "The Commander of I Corps was tasked with reviewing the possibility of multiservice base operations; the Commander of III Corps was tasked with exploring development of 'centers of excellence' for various base functions so that one base would become expert in and assume responsibility for certain functions such as contract management for multiple bases; the commander of XVIII Airborne Corps was tasked with examining community partnership; and the commander of USARC was

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<sup>32</sup> Wilson, PG 6.

<sup>33</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 8.

tasked with examining options for reserve component support apart from reliance on active duty bases.”<sup>34</sup>

The Army is continuing the effort to develop more efficient ways to maintain their base support operations by consolidating their base support operations with other co-located military services.

In 1995 FORSCOM pursued the interservice support concept with the Air Force’s Air Mobility Command (AMC). The Commanding General of FORSCOM sent a letter to the Commander of AMC to come to an agreement to let the Commanding Officers at Fort Lewis and McChord conduct studies involving the feasibility of consolidating the base support operations that were being performed by both bases. The AMC Commander’s response agreed that consolidating the support services would be feasible and cost effective and gave his Wing Commander at McChord permission to pursue the joint effort.<sup>35</sup> Unfortunately for the cause, the AMC Commander also made the following statement:

Air Force philosophy has always been that our Commanders must have the tools both to accomplish their mission and take care of their people. Every time in the past that we have deviated from this principle, especially in our rush to find efficiencies in base support operations, the results have been less than satisfactory. That said, if cost savings or service improvements can be realized without infringing on these two basic Command responsibilities, then these opportunities should be explored.<sup>36</sup>

Air Force leadership seemed less enthusiastic than the Army about entering into the partnership. Air Force leadership has indicated that their superior quality of life

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<sup>34</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 8.

<sup>35</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 9.

<sup>36</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 9.

standards and mission readiness would be severely degraded by an interservice support program with another Service. In addition, both Services were concerned about key functions being taken over by the other service.<sup>37</sup>

The Army also looked at consolidating support operations at Fort Dix, McGuire Air Force Base and Lakehurst Naval Air Station, which are adjacent to each other, but none of the projects have produced significant results.<sup>38</sup>

Ms. Wilson points out that:

Virtually all the Services prefer to retain their own base operations support, independent of the other Services. After all, it is less complex to provide services to a homogenous group that has shared quality of life expectations and standards than it is to provide these same services to a diverse group of warfighters who have different cultures, support expectations, and quality of life standards.<sup>39</sup>

## **2. Navy**

Top Navy officials have also been looking into ways to make base support services more efficient. "The Navy is currently emphasizing regionalization and consolidation of support functions involving its own facilities more than interservicing."<sup>40</sup>

The Navy's policy is that where there are other service installations located near the Navy installations, they will cooperate with the consolidation of support services. Unfortunately, few Navy bases are co-located with other Service's installations.

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<sup>37</sup> Wilson, PG 16.

<sup>38</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 10.

<sup>39</sup> Wilson, PG 8-9.

<sup>40</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 10

The Navy, in conjunction with the other Services, does operate Joint Reserve Bases (JRBs). The JRBs are discussed later in this chapter.

### **3. Air Force**

As mentioned earlier, the Air Force leadership appears more hesitant to consolidate because they perceive that their quality of life and mission readiness will be damaged. Also it is interesting to note that the Air Force is not emphasizing regionalization.

However, the Air Force is trying to make an effort to consider interservice base support programs. "In December 1995, all Air Force major commands were asked to gather information regarding the level of savings that had been achieved through interservicing over the past two years."<sup>41</sup>

## **E. IMPEDIMENTS TO CONSOLIDATION**

### **1. Effectiveness Questioned**

Several DOD officials have questioned the effectiveness of large-scale DOD consolidation in areas such as accounting and printing. "Many personnel voiced concern that these functions, after consolidation, appeared to be less responsive, less timely, and perhaps more costly than when each of the services were separately responsible for these functions."<sup>42</sup> These views have not been substantiated but have affected the considerations of related interservice support initiatives.

### **2. Resistance to Change and Loss of Control**

The resistance to change and the perceived loss of control of the commander's assets are large obstacles to overcome if consolidation is to take place. Many

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<sup>41</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 11.

<sup>42</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 11-12.

commanders are comfortable with the status quo and do not foresee any reason to change the rules of the game on their watch. Commanders also fear that once they give up control of a support function they will not have any control over that asset and will not be in the decision-loop to determine priorities. Commanders fear they will not be able to influence servicing priorities that they deem important to supporting their missions.<sup>43</sup>

### **3. Cultural Differences**

Differences in traditions, cultures, practices and standards among the different services have also been an obstruction to consolidating base support services among the military branches.<sup>44</sup> Wilson notes an example of this. "Most Air Force members believe that their quality of life standards are superior to those of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps."<sup>45</sup>

### **4. Past Failures**

A GAO report stated that:

Two of the most notable interservicing type efforts initiated in the 1970s and the 1980s proved unsuccessful. They involved consolidated management of real property maintenance and contracting activities in the San Antonio, Texas, area and consolidated family housing for military personnel in Oahu, Hawaii.<sup>46</sup>

The two examples of failed joint ventures have one thing in common; the Service's leaders did not want to give up control.

The first failed attempt example is the San Antonio Real Property Maintenance Agency. In the mid to late 1970s, the Army and Air Force activities within the San

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<sup>43</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 12.

<sup>44</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 12.

<sup>45</sup> Wilson, PG 9.

Antonio area were ordered to form a joint activity for the maintenance of their housing. A joint public works office was to be established for all the Army/Air Force housing. The consolidation was projected to save over \$2.2 million a year. A GAO report contained the following statement:

In a 1989 report we stated that DOD approved the request to dissolve the consolidation based on studies performed by it and the Air Force that cited installation commanders' concern over lack of command and control of their engineering support functions.<sup>47</sup>

In July 1982, there was another consolidation. In Oahu, Hawaii, the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps were directed to consolidate family housing operations and maintenance by the start of the next fiscal year. The savings were projected at about \$737,000 annually. The project was closed in 1994. The following is a quote from the report on the reasons for failure.

According to DOD officials and the Army Audit Agency, the consolidated family housing program failed because of funding uncertainties and shortfalls, as well as the services' prejudice toward retaining control over their own housing, a reluctance on the part of the services from the beginning to fully participate, and various problems associated with the Army's management of the program. Reluctance to participate was illustrated by the fact that the other services continued to maintain their own housing organizations to some extent while the Army was officially responsible for managing the program and paying the bills.<sup>48</sup>

#### **F. GAO RECOMMENDATION**

The following is the GAO recommendation for consolidation of support services among the military branches:

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<sup>46</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 19.

<sup>47</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 19.

<sup>48</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 20.

Given the potential for significant savings in base support costs through interservicing type arrangements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) identify options and take steps to minimize the impediments to interservicing and (2) emphasize interservicing as part of contracting out deliberations to maximize potential savings and efficiencies.<sup>49</sup>

#### **G. DOD RESPONSE**

In response to the GAO report GAO/NSIAD-96-108, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense stated:

The DOD concurs with both recommendations in the draft report; although, we request considerations of the following comments in preparation of the final report. The report does not adequately recognize Air Force and Defense Agency efforts to achieve major savings through interservice support. For example, recent Air Force efforts include a review of all their base operating support requirements in the Denver area, and a study of Air Force and NASA intragovernmental support requirements. The Government is also benefiting tremendously from more than 1800 support agreements promoted and administrated by Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). DLA has developed an innovative billing system for interservice support agreements that is being made available to other DOD Services and Agencies. Using this system, which provides increased visibility of support costs, one DLA customer was able to reduce its support costs by almost \$2 million (50%).<sup>50</sup>

#### **H. INTERSERVICE SUPPORT AT JOINT RESERVE BASES (JRB)**

When JRBs were introduced in 1994, they were intended to be a model for future consolidations. Consolidating reserve components on one base had the potential to bring about better training, reduce infrastructure costs and assist the Services in pooling their resources.<sup>51</sup>

JRBs were conceived from the base realignment and closure (BRAC) procedure. During the process some bases were consolidated to form Joint Reserve Bases.

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<sup>49</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 14.

<sup>50</sup> GAO/NSIAD-96-108, PG 24.

<sup>51</sup> Ginburg, (Purple Bases), PG 21.



As an example, in Texas the Navy and Texas Air National Guard (TANG) were operating aboard NAS Dallas and the Air Force had a command operating on the soon to be closed Carswell Air Force Base, which was about 40 miles to the west of NAS Dallas. The committee decided to close NAS Dallas and convert Carswell to a JRB and rename it NAS JRB Fort Worth. The Navy moved to Fort Worth from Dallas and took control of the base. TANG also moved aboard and the Air Force 301<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing remained onboard as a tenant command. Robert Greene, director facilities, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Material and Facilities) noted the following: "The idea was simple: Have the different branches integrate support services to avoid redundancy and save money."<sup>52</sup>

The Commanding Officer of NAS JRB Fort Worth had the following comment: "As we are in a period of declining dollars and resources we really need to look at ways to combine services."<sup>53</sup>

At NAS JRB Willow Grove, PA, the Navy is in charge of operating the runway, the Air Force runs the fuel farm and all of the tenants provide base security.<sup>54</sup> "If one of the services weren't there, the base couldn't function," explained Capt. Thomas Nagelin Jr, Willow Grove's Commanding Officer."<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Ginburg, (Joint Bases), PG 19.

<sup>53</sup> Ginburg, (Joint Bases), PG 19.

<sup>54</sup> Ginburg, (Joint Bases), PG 20.

<sup>55</sup> Ginburg, (Joint Bases), PG 19.

At NAS JRB Fort Worth, the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force consolidated their base security, transportation, and medical operations.<sup>56</sup>

Where else will you find a sailor driving an Air Force vehicle while guarding a Marine Corps plane,' said Air Force Brig Gen. Bob Efferson, Commanding Officer of the 301<sup>st</sup> Fighter Squadron, one of the tenant commands aboard Fort Worth.<sup>57</sup>

At Fort Worth, the consolidated Security Department saved \$90,000 in one year on security overtime alone.<sup>58</sup>

Consolidation of support services has the potential to save money by eliminating redundancies, but it also has a larger benefit of increasing the readiness of our Armed Forces. Captain Nagelin had this comment:

By working together in peacetime, going to war together won't be such a shock. It'll be one less thing with which to contend.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Ginburg, (Purple Bases), PG 21.

<sup>57</sup> Ginburg, (Purple Bases), PG 21.

<sup>58</sup> Ginburg, (Purple Bases), PG 21.

<sup>59</sup> Ginburg, (Purple Bases), PG 21.

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### III. DATA ANALYSIS

#### A. INTRODUCTION

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 11 DOD employees working in a Joint Service, or consolidated Service environment. Interview transcripts are in Appendixes A – L. Interviews were conducted with the following personnel:

- NAS JRB Fort Worth current Commanding Officer (CO) (Navy O-6) [Appendix A]
- NAS JRB Fort Worth former CO (Navy O-6) [Appendix B]
- NAS JRB Fort Worth Supply Officer (Navy O-5) and Deputy Supply Officer (Navy O-4) [Appendix C]
- NAS JRB former Deputy Supply Officer (Navy O-5) [Appendix D]
- NAS JRB Base Police Chief (Air Force GS-12) and Assistant Base Police Chief (Navy E-8) [Appendix E]
- NAS JRB Fort Worth Patrol Officers [Appendix F]
  - TANG full time support E-5
  - Navy active duty E-5
- NAS JRB Fort Worth Aviation Fuels Division Officer (Navy E-7) [Appendix G]
- NAS JRB Fort Worth Contracting Division Officer (Navy GS-11) [Appendix H]
- NAS JRB Fort Worth Chief Dispatcher for Transportation (TANG E-6) [Appendix I]
- NAS JRB Fort Worth Administrative Division Senior Chief (Navy E-8) [Appendix J]
- Naval Reserve Officer (O-3) training at NAS JRB Fort Worth [Appendix K]

Questions were drawn from the question bank in Appendix L. Each interview was tailored somewhat to the person being interviewed. For example, the questions for each interview varied depending on the interviewee's job position. Military officers and

civilian managers were asked more policy type questions than the enlisted personnel.

Also, responses have been edited and summarized for presentation purposes.

## **B. THEMES EMERGING FROM THE INTERVIEWS**

Four major themes that emerged from the interview process are listed below:

- The consolidation of support functions among the Services is perceived to be more efficient than each Service operating independently
- The consolidation of support functions is perceived to improve performance
- Some cultural differences were evident among the four Services, however, those differences were perceived to be relatively minor and easily overcome
- There should be a DOD standard set of instructions developed for consolidation of support services

The four central findings or themes emerging from the interviews are explained in further detail by including relevant comments of various participants.

### **1. The Consolidation of Support Functions among the Services is Perceived to be More Efficient than Each Service Operating Independently**

Approximately 10 of 11 respondents indicated that consolidating support services improves efficiency by reducing the redundancy of each Service running a separate operation.

- **Current CO:** By consolidating the support functions among the Services, there is a decrease in redundancy and we have a better use of resources. The Services work well together to enable everyone to function better. Our Security Department is a good example; there are Air Force, Navy, and TANG personnel working together. They all have different backgrounds and experience levels and when they combine their knowledge and skills; they are better off than if each Service worked separately.
- **Former CO:** Since each Service desires to operate a service in just a bit different fashion, the real efficiencies come from not having to have multiple facilities to operate a service. The biggest efficiency at Fort Worth comes from the combination of security forces and operation of the fuel farm by one contractor.

- **Base Police Chief:** Yes, [consolidation] is much more efficient. It lets us operate all of our forces under one roof. We have Navy active duty, Reservists, and civilians; Air Force Reservists, and civilians; TANG full time support; and Marine Reservists. There is no separation of duties by Service. We all work together, we rotate everyone through the various jobs such as gate guard, security patrol and aircraft security regardless of what Service they are in. If we were to operate separately as they do on other bases, it would be a waste of valuable resources because there would be a lot of redundancy.
- **Two Base Police Patrol Officers: TANG E-5 and Navy E-5:**
  - **TANG P.O.:** Yes, we are able to get more done with less people. I think they are using us better than if each Service patrolled their own area
  - **Navy P.O.:** I agree, when we work together each Service knows what the other Service is doing and that avoids the situation of a Navy Patrol Officer doing the same thing that a TANG Patrol Officer is doing
- **Fuels Officer:** Yes, [consolidation] would cut down on the redundancy of having three services doing the same thing. Right now the Air Force fuels Air Force planes, TANG (Texas Air National Guard) fuels TANG planes, and the Navy fuels Navy, Marine Corps and transient aircraft. There is no reason that we could not consolidate. If we consolidate we could eliminate the need for contracted fuel delivery and cut down on the number of delivery trucks required. It would save a lot of money.
- **Navy Contracting Officer:** Yes, it is more efficient. Contracting would become more efficient because you would eliminate the redundancy of the different Contracting Officers doing the same job in separate locations.
- 2. **The Consolidation of Support Functions is Perceived to Improve Performance**

Approximately 10 of 11 participants clearly indicated that consolidating support services improves performance. Cross-training and working alongside other Servicemembers seems to instill a healthy competition, which actually increases teamwork and improves results.

- **Former CO:** Yes, [consolidation] cuts down on the number of intermediate layers of management to get the job done. It does require buy in from the various Services and trust that the one Service that operates the program will look out for everyone's needs equally.

- **Base Police Chief:** Yes, the performance is improved. Each Service gets cross-trained in the way in which the other Services operate. That makes us more proficient operating as one unit that can handle any situation from any Service. The alternative is to have multiple Base Police Departments that can only handle Service specific situations.
- **Base Police Patrol Officers:**
  - **TANG P.O.:** Yes, [performance improved] I think so. At first it was hard to get used to working with the Navy guys, just because it was a different experience but when you think of it, we were doing the same basic job and there was no reason not to consolidate.
  - **Navy P.O.:** I think it is better that we are working together. I think that working as one department, regardless of our Service, gets rid of the "us verses them" attitude and makes us one big team. I think that improves our work ethic and our performance.
- **Navy Contracting Officer:** Yes, consolidation will not only make us more efficient, it will also help us do the job better. One Contracting Officer supporting all Services is better than separate Contracting Officers for each Service. The cross training will make us more versatile.

**3. Some Cultural Differences were Evident among the Four Services, however, Those Differences were Perceived to be Relatively Minor and Easily Overcome**

All 11 respondents commented on cultural differences between their Services, but

10 of 11 indicated that any cultural differences could be overcome.

- **Current CO:** No, cultural differences among the Services do not hinder us at this level. We care about accomplishing the mission of the base, it does not matter whether a person is in a Navy uniform, Air Force uniform or any other Service uniform, and we get the mission done. That is what we are concerned with at this level.
- **Former CO:** Not really, as you drill down in the instructions and operating procedures the biggest difference we have found is in semantics. We all do the job basically the same way but use different terminology.
- **Supply Officer:** The key is getting people to change their mindsets. I think a lot of the cultural differences can be overcome by developing a standard instruction among the Services. Once everyone is playing by the same rules the cultural differences will be minor. I think that the "cultural difference" is just a lame excuse for Services not wanting to work with each other. There will always be cultural differences, it is our job to overcome the differences and come together as a team. Each Service has a

variety of people from many different cultures, we are not homogenous, but we still get the job done.

- **Base Police Chief:** There are no great cultural differences per se because when it comes down to it we are all Police Officers regardless of which branch of Service we are in. The bond between Police Officers is stronger than the Service differences.
  - **Base Police Patrol Officers:**
    - **TANG P.O.:** No, not in the long run. When we were first combined, I think we were suspicious of each other and the fact that each Service had their own regulations did not help. We all had the attitude that, our way is the right way and your way is the wrong way. When we sat down and looked at the differences, we realized that we were more the same than we were different.
    - **Navy P.O.:** I don't think that in any Service cultural differences really get in the way. My colleague is right; when we first get here we are a little apprehensive of doing something new. It helps that there are people here that already have a handle on working together. I rotated into here when the system was already set up and running so it was easier for me. I admire the original people that were here when the joint base was first stood up; they had to pave the way for us.
  - **Fuels Officer:** No, cultural differences would not get in the way. We may be of different Services but we are all fuel people. There is a standard language in the fuels area that transcends military boundaries. Sometimes I can communicate better with an Air Force fueler than I can with a Navy non-fueler.
  - **Navy Contracting Officer:** Yes, it can be a challenge to overcome. The Navy and Air Force have distinct different cultures. The Navy goes to Sea and the Air Force does not. I am in the Air Force Reserves and I work for the Navy so I can see the differences first hand. On the other hand, I think I am a prime example of how one can overcome the cultural differences. The Navy is not a homogenous organization; there are different cultures and backgrounds among the Sailors. The Navy has operated effectively for many years with diverse cultures. That shows that people can work together effectively despite of coming from different cultures.
4. **There Should be a DoD Standard Set of Instructions Developed for Consolidation of Support Services**

The most substantial barrier to consolidation of support services that emerged from the interviews was the lack of joint instructions written pertaining to consolidating



support services. Approximately 7 of 11 participants noted that joint instructions from DOD leadership would greatly improve efforts to successfully consolidate various functions.

- **Current CO:** The other major issue to overcome is the fact that we have separate instructions for each Service. To illustrate my point, take Base Security again. The Navy instructions require our patrol officers to carry shotguns and the Air Force regulations require them to carry M-16s on patrol. The question is what do the patrol officers in a joint security department carry? There is no DOD instruction that gives us guidance on this. After much debate we ended up letting the Navy carry shotguns and the Air Force M-16s. A DOD instruction could have helped us avoid a lot of headaches.
- **Supply Officer:** [We should] develop a standard operating procedure for all Services to follow. Do this by taking all the service procedures and use the most stringent rules and regulations from each one and combine them into one joint set of procedures. Doing this prior to any consolidation would make the consolidation so much smoother. The departments that are "joint" would not have to guess which service regulation to use.
- **Navy Supply O-5:** The largest obstacle that we must work around is the question of whose standards are we to operate by? Each Service has their own standards and operating procedures. When we consolidate support services it must be determined which standards to use, otherwise there will be no organization and that would defeat the purpose of trying to become more efficient. We need to have consolidated instructions from above.
- **Base Police Chief:** The big difference that we have had to overcome in our 6 years of operation is that each Service has its own specific instructions. We have some local instructions that we have written up using the most stringent standards from each service and combining them into one instruction. We are still waiting for a consolidated DOD instruction from the upper level leaders, way above the base level.
- **Assistant Base Police Chief:** There is no official instruction that states how we should operate above the command level. We got tired of waiting for a DOD instruction so we wrote some local instructions. We took the Navy SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) and the Air Force OIs (Operating Instructions) and merged them into what we have titled JSOPs (Joint Standard Operating Procedures). In order to do this, we used the strictest standards from both Service instructions and combined them into local JSOPs.
- **Fuels Officer:** The thing that we do need is a single instruction for all Air Force, TANG, and Navy fueling operations. We wrote an instruction for this base that was a compilation of the Navy and Air Force standard

operation procedures by taking the most stringent rules of each service and making it one joint instruction. Our instruction that we worked very hard on stalled somewhere up the chain of command. What has to happen is that the instruction should be written at the DOD level.

## **B. STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS (SWOT) ANALYSIS**

Included in the methodology of the interview process was to elicit responses concerning the perceived strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) associated with consolidating support functions. These assessment factors comprise the classic SWOT analysis, a popular strategic planning tool.<sup>60</sup>

### **1. Strengths**

#### ***a. Greater Efficiency***

Approximately 10 of the 11 interviewees agreed that the consolidation of support functions among the Services would reduce redundancy and save resources. As evidenced by quotes in the previous section of this chapter, respondents perceive that combining support functions is clearly more efficient than each Service performing like functions independently.

#### ***b. Better Interservice Relationships***

Better relationships are fostered among the Services when servicemembers work together in support functions. The relationships that develop from consolidating support functions should enable the Services to obtain increased efficiencies in other applicable joint areas.

- **Current CO:** The major strength is that we are setting a precedent. The experience we obtain from our success here will be a good springboard for further consolidations. If we can show that we can work well at this level it could spread up the chain. If the Services at the Pentagon could cooperate and trust each other the way the services do at this level the

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<sup>60</sup> Bryson, 1995.

budgeting and QDR processes could be much easier. If all services work jointly and understand each others missions and needs, there will be less of a struggle for a piece of the pie [dollars].

- **Fuels Officer:** There are two large strengths of consolidation. First, it saves a lot of money and resources. Second, it will help us establish long term working relationships with the other services, and that will help us in the time of conflict or war.
- **Base Police Chief:** Consolidating on the support activities will develop better cooperation and communication among the Services and that could expand into operational areas and make our national defense a stronger more flexible operation.

*c. Cross-training Among the Services is Perceived to have the Potential to Improve Productivity*

Cross-training creates common ways to perform some generic tasks, e.g., refueling. To the extent that members from each Service learn common ways to perform various functions, overall DOD productivity and capability are enhanced, i.e., built-in redundancy is a strength in this context.

- **Base Police Chief:** Each Service gets cross-trained in the way in which the other Services operate. That makes us more proficient operating as one unit that can handle any situation from any Service. The alternative is to have multiple Base Police Departments that can only handle Service specific situations.
- **Contracting Officer:** The major strength or advantage is the continuity. Each Contracting Officer would be cross trained in the methods of the other services. The ability to specialize in several areas would increase. An example outside of contracting is the training of pilots. Why can't the Navy and Air Force consolidate their training? Teach them to fly. The Navy pilots could learn the Air Force techniques and the Air Force could learn how the Navy does things. The result is that the nation will have pilots highly skilled in multiple areas. An Air Force pilot would be able to land on an aircraft carrier.

**2. Weaknesses**

*a. Apparent Lack of Support from the Top Levels of DOD*

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, there are insufficient DOD instructions to guide and implement the consolidation process. The absence of joint

instructions combined with a perceived lack of support from the top leaders were the predominate weaknesses that arose during the interviews.

- **Current CO:** We cannot do it all from the base level, our leaders must also adopt the same attitude that we have. And then we could think of establishing purple budlines [Budget Lines of accounting – i.e. funding].  
There should be DOD instructions that take the most stringent standards from individual service instructions and applies them to joint instructions. In our Base Security Department we have written several local instructions that work well. Now we just have to get the leaders in places above the base level to buy into the joint concept and write some DOD instructions.
- **Supply Officer:** In order to do any of this [consolidation], we need support from the top. The joint instructions and standards must come from the Pentagon level. We cannot write the instructions at this level and be effective. Some prime examples of areas that need to be standardized among the services are the logistics and finance operations. The service support systems could not communicate with each other without first standardizing these two areas.
- **Navy Supply O-5:** You need a standard system to work from. We tend to be our own worst enemy. You need to know which system to work from to become more effective as a department. To do that you must have a standard instruction. It would be best if it were a DOD instruction that spelled out the specific duties of all the services involved.
- **Base Police Chief:** The problem is that no one above the base level has signed on to the concept of a consolidated Base Police Department. We all get along fine at this level but as you go up the chain it gets more difficult. If there is any future in consolidating Base Police Departments on other installations there is going to have to be more cooperation from above.

There has been no edict from above to do a combined instruction; we did it on our own at the base level, through the Commanding Officer of course. We never get anything from above; it seems that the top leaders are waiting to see if consolidation works before they commit to it.

### 3. Opportunities

Respondents articulated various opportunities that could result from consolidating support functions among the Services. Indeed, a central premise of this study is that

consolidation has the potential to generate considerable savings throughout DOD, i.e. reduce redundancy and streamline like functions. Additionally, several respondents indicated that consolidation efforts could be expanded into other untapped areas, i.e., increased operational and logistic arenas.

- **Current CO:** Yes there are future opportunities. I know that the Secretary of Defense has requested another round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). That means that we will see many more base closings and consolidations. One way to save bases is to consolidate. We are going to have many high-ranking officials visiting our base to look at Fort Worth as an example of the future. We are going to be the sample for other JRBs to follow.

There are other opportunities out there. The Navy Exchange (NEX) should be consolidated with AAFES (Army and Air Force Exchange Service). They are two separated organizations that do the exact same thing. I think that instead of NEX and AAFES being separate entities, they should be consolidated into one "Armed Forces Exchange Service".

The other important opportunity of consolidation that surfaced during the interviews was the importance of the Services building good relationships. The cooperation among the Services in consolidating support functions leads to better interservice performance and should enable Servicemembers to work better in joint efforts during times of war or crisis.

- **Current CO:** Another benefit from consolidating the support services on base is that it helps develop a working camaraderie among the different services. Once the services work together at this level, when we get into a conflict or go to war our Joint War fighting capability will be enhanced because we have already established good working relationships among the services.
- **Supply Officer:** From an operational standpoint it [consolidation] would be better too. If we work together on the peacetime support functions we will already be working together if we enter into a war or conflict. The command, control, and communications would be much stronger. So it is not just a matter of saving money by consolidating the support functions. If we consolidate wisely we will have a stronger national defense.

#### 4. Threats

##### a. *Consolidation Translates into Actual and Perceived Loss of Jobs for Civilians*

The largest threat that emerged from the interviews was the possible and actual loss of civilian jobs. The loss of jobs seems inevitable with consolidation and it was considered a threat by almost all that were interviewed. Many respondents also concurred that it was a necessary evil associated with becoming efficient.

- **Current CO:** There is a fear of job losses among the Civil Servants. The civilians suffer from what has been termed as the "Invasion of the Ations". In the recent times the civilians have come to fear words ending with "ation" because it always means cutbacks and lost jobs. Words such as privatization, consolidation, etc. They are scared and they have a valid point. Unfortunately anytime you trim the fat from any organization there are people who suffer the consequences, it just can't be helped.
- **Supply Officer:** The largest threat of consolidation is the probable job losses for our civilian workers. As I have stated before that is just one of the things that we are going to have to live with. I am sorry that people will lose their jobs but if we are going to streamline our operations, there will be some job losses and there is nothing we can do about that.
- **Base Police Chief:** The primary threat from consolidation or any streamlining project that is aimed at saving money is the loss of jobs. The civilians lose their jobs and the military loses billets. That may be a hard thing to take but it is necessary if we want to achieve our goal of a more efficient department through consolidation. Let's face it, consolidation is the wave of the future and you must take the bad things that come along with any progress.
- **Contracting Officer:** The threat is the perception of job security. The civil service work force perceives that consolidation will mean fewer jobs. Unfortunately they are correct. A leaner more efficient force will decrease the number of jobs for the civilians and also decrease the number of billets for the active duty military. That is something we have to live with. Over time as we have improved technology we have been able to accomplish tasks with fewer resources and sometimes those reduced resources are human resources. On the other hand, if we educate our personnel about the advantages of consolidation it will lesson the perception of reduced job security. Once the personnel realize that being cross-trained will make them more versatile and valuable they will have a better attitude.

Almost everyone interviewed had positive things to say about consolidating support services among the Services. Some respondents believed the system could be improved, but overall, every participant except one voiced markedly positive attitudes and comments about consolidation. One interviewee voiced negative comments, and was not in favor of consolidating the Transportation Department.

## IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis examined the consolidation of support functions among military Services at a Naval Air Station, Joint Reserve Base. A strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis was conducted based on extensive field interviews with 11 relevant stakeholders. Conclusions and recommendations were drawn to assist DOD planners attempting to improve or expand consolidation efforts.

The method of analysis included literature review of interservice support documents, and field interviews of 11 military and civilian personnel involved in support service consolidation at Naval Air Station (NAS) Joint Reserve Base (JRB) Fort Worth, Texas. The following conclusions and recommendations should assist leaders and managers in developing policy changes designed to improve interservice consolidation.

### A. CONCLUSIONS

- **There is a lack of Department of Defense (DOD) direction concerning guidance and implementation of Interservice support, e.g., lack of joint policies and DOD instructions**

Consensus among seven DOD managers working in interservice support was that there are insufficient DOD instructions to guide them. They expressed that without clear guidance from top DOD leadership, it is difficult to coordinate interservice support functions. Each Service has its own unique standards and instructions. Without a joint instruction, there is confusion about which Service's standards to implement.

Some interservice support departments examined in this study found ways to work around the lack of DOD instructions by writing local joint instructions. Local



instructions help the various departments operate, but joint instructions would greatly facilitate the consolidation functions and processes.

A senior civilian at NAS JRB Fort Worth clearly articulated that the biggest obstacle the combined Police Department had to overcome was that each Service had its own specific instructions. He said the first few years were particularly difficult because there were no clear guidelines on which instructions to follow. Eventually the Police Department wrote local instructions using the most stringent standards from each Service. If there had been DOD instructions at the inception of the joint Police Department, efficiency and productivity would have been substantially enhanced.

- **Consolidating support functions among the Services is more efficient than each Service operating independently**

The consolidation of support functions increases efficiencies by eliminating the redundancy of each Service essentially doing identical support functions. Consolidating support functions among the Services decreases redundancy, saves resources and enables the Services to operate more efficiently.

- **Consolidating support functions improves performance**

Consolidation eliminates or reduces the number of intermediate layers of personnel necessary to accomplish the unit mission. The reduction of layers of personnel decreases the amount of personnel in the chain of command, thereby reducing cycle time and improving performance.

Also, consolidating support functions improves performance by encouraging servicemembers to learn new ways of doing business. Cross-training and working alongside other servicemembers generates common ways to perform generic tasks, e.g., refueling. This commonality of performing like functions breaks down unnecessary

barriers between the Services, and has the potential of enhancing combat effectiveness in joint arenas.

- **Some cultural differences were evident among the four Services, however, those differences are relatively minor and easily overcome**

There are clearly cultural differences among the Services. On NAS JRB Fort Worth there are evident differences between the Navy and the Air Force/Texas Air National Guard (TANG). The Navy and Air Force differ in terms of history, tradition, and behavioral norms. The Navy has over 200 years of history while the Air Force, at a little more than 50 years old, is a relatively new Service. The Naval personnel appear more tradition-oriented, whereas the Air Force personnel appear are more progressive and technology-oriented. A TANG respondent said that the Navy is extremely tradition conscious and they (the Navy) focus too much on rank.

Another cultural difference between the Air Force and the Navy is Quality of Life (QOL) standards. A Navy Supply Corps senior officer noted:

There is a cultural difference between the Navy and Air Force personnel on Quality of Life. That affects the support services. An example is berthing. An Air Force enlisted person is entitled by Air Force regulations to have a private BEQ (Bachelor Enlisted Quarters) room and Navy enlisted personnel below the grade of E7 must double-up on rooms.

The different QOL standards between the Services indirectly impede consolidation efforts. It is more difficult to consolidate support functions when Services are emphasizing dissimilar standards.

Fortunately, the cultural barriers may actually be minor, and respondents in this study perceived that differences could be resolved. The compelling factor appears to center around a unified military work ethic. When military personnel work alongside one

another, they apparently forget their differences and concentrate on accomplishing the job. Working together in a professional environment tends to eliminate the "our Service versus their Service" mentality. There appears to be a link among different servicemembers on an occupational level that bonds them professionally. The NAS JRB Fort Worth Police Chief said:

There are no great cultural differences per se because when it comes down to it, we are all Police Officers regardless of which branch of Service we are in. The bond between Police Officers is stronger than the Service differences.

The NAS JRB Fuels Officer stated:

No, cultural differences would not get in the way. We may be of different Services but we are all fuel people. There is a standard language in the fuels area that transcends military boundaries. Sometimes I can communicate better with an Air Force fueler than I can with a Navy non-fueler.

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS**

- DOD and JCS senior leadership should give increased priority to developing and promulgating standardized instructions for interservice support functions.
- Service leaders should find additional avenues to link and exchange information among various Servicemembers based on profession or skill, e.g., Military Police Association, Logistics Specialist Association, etc. The objective is to inculcate interservice operability at multiple levels.
- Service leaders should build more interservice operability into their strategic and operational plans. Consolidation strengthens National Defense by unifying execution of like tasks and functions. Inclusion of interservice operability into strategic plans ensures that different Services can depend on their counterparts during times of crisis.
- Increase interservice graduate education opportunities by purposefully including officers from all Services.

## **APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW WITH NAS JRB FORT WORTH COMMANDING OFFICER**

The following is an interview with the Commanding Officer (CO) of NAS JRB Fort Worth. Notes were taken, but responses are paraphrased for summary and presentation purposes.

Prior to going into the "prepared" questions, the CO was asked about his overall opinion of the "joint concept" aboard NAS JRB Fort Worth. The following represents his responses.

Right now the Services aboard the base are Navy and Marine Corps, Air Force, and TANG and we all work together really well. The Army is supposed to move aboard in the future, we just have to iron out some details about where to locate them on base.

The overall spirit of everyone on base is great. All the services have a great attitude; you could say it is a "union" like mentality.

On NAS JRB Fort Worth our mission is the training of Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and TANG reservists. We accomplish that mission without regard for the color of uniform. We have been able to do that with great success here. We do have some support services that are consolidated. The support services that are consolidated are Base Security and Transportation. Our Medical Detachment has been referred to as joint because the clinic supports all the embarked services and the retirees in the community. Most of the retirees are Air Force, since this base was formerly Carswell Air Force Base. But Medical is not joint in the true sense of the word because the Medical Department is manned only by Navy staff.

There are some other areas that we are looking at consolidating. Those areas are the Family Service Center, Public Affairs and the Fuel Farm. Out of those three, the Family Service Center should be the easiest to consolidate because they already serve all the services and 60% of their funding is from a joint budget line or what are called "Purple Funds".

**Is the consolidation of the support services more efficient and effective than each military service operating their own support service?**

I think consolidating the support services is a good idea. When done right, it is more efficient and effective. By consolidating the support functions among the Services, there is a decrease in redundancy and we use have a better use of resources. The Services work well together and they are able to bring different perspectives and skills together to enable everyone to function better. Our Security Department is a good example; there are Air Force, Navy, and TANG personnel working together. They all have different backgrounds and experience levels and when they combine their knowledge and skills they are better off than if each Service working separately.

**Are there any barriers to the consolidation?**

Yes there are a few major stumbling blocks to be worked out. There are two big obstacles. The first roadblock is the "Color of Money" issue. Each Service has its own budline (budget line). If you want true "jointness" there has to be a way of funding joint bases and support activities with purple funds. I spent several years at the Pentagon working with the Quadrennial Defense Review and the primary mission of each Service was to get as much money as possible before the other Services beat you out for the funds. When I was in Washington, it was said, "When you talk to an Air Force Officer,

you usually get kicked in the shin and get your pocket picked." That was not as much as an exaggeration as you might think, each Service closely guards its funds and programs for fear of losing to the other services. We work well together on this base because there is little politics involved. We are here to accomplish our mission and each service contributes to that mission.

We cannot do it all from the base level, our leaders must also adopt the same attitude that we have. And then we could think of establishing a purple budline.

The other major issue to overcome is the fact that we have separate instructions for each Service. To illustrate my point, take Base Security again. The Navy instructions require our patrol officers to carry shotguns and the Air Force regulations require them to carry M-16s on patrol. The question is what do the patrol officers in a joint security department carry? There is no DOD instruction that gives us guidance on this. After much debate we ended up letting the Navy carry shotguns and the Air Force M-16s. A DOD instruction could have helped us avoid a lot of headaches. There should be DOD instructions that take the most stringent standards from individual service instructions and applies them to joint instructions. In our Base Security Department we have written several local instructions that work well. Now we just have to get the leaders in places above the base level to buy into the joint concept and write some DOD instructions.

**Do the cultural differences among the different services get in the way of effective consolidation?**

No, cultural differences among the Services do not hinder us at this level. As I stated earlier, we care about accomplishing the mission of the base, it does not matter

whether a person is in a Navy uniform, Air Force uniform or any other Service uniform, and we get the mission done. That is what we are concerned with at this level.

**What are some strengths of consolidating the support services among the military services?**

The major strength is that we are setting a precedent. The experience we obtain from our success here will be a good springboard for further consolidations. If we can show that we can work well at this level it could spread up the chain. If the Services at the Pentagon could cooperate and trust each other the way the services do at this level the budgeting and QDR processes could be much easier.

If all services work jointly and understand each others missions and needs, there will be less of a struggle for a piece of the pie [dollars].

Another benefit from consolidating the support services on base is that it helps develop a working camaraderie among the different services. Once the services work together at this level, when we get into a conflict or go to war our Joint War fighting capability will be enhanced because we have already established good working relationships among the services.

**Do you see any weaknesses of consolidating the support services among the military services?**

There are not many weaknesses if the consolidation is done right and supported from above. But there are some obstacles to overcome and until those obstacles are conquered, they can be perceived to be weaknesses. Those weaknesses are:

- The "Color of Money" problem. As I mentioned earlier, unless you consolidate the funding at the top levels and create "Purple Dollars", it will be hard to generate a truly joint base or support service.
- There must be consolidated DOD instructions. It is hard to run a joint operation if everyone is using service unique instructions.
- There is a general attitude to play it safe and not jump "outside of the box" or try new things. I call these people the naysayers. These people are scared to try new things. A good example is Public Works (PW) on our base. I think it should be a prime candidate for consolidation. It makes no sense to operate two PW departments on the same base. The resources that could be saved by PW consolidation are tremendous but the politics come into play. For a consolidated service we would have to be funded by purple dollars or one service would have to give the other service funding. I think as I stated earlier the consolidation of funding would be the key for consolidating PW because it would be hard to convince any service to fund *someone else's* PW.

**Does the consolidation of support services among the military services present any future opportunities?**

Yes there are future opportunities. I know that the Secretary of Defense has requested another round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). That means that we will see many more base closings and consolidations. One way to save bases is to consolidate. We are going to have many high-ranking officials visiting our base to look at NAS JRB Fort Worth as an example of the future. We are going to be the sample for other JRBs to follow.

There are other opportunities out there. The Navy Exchange (NEX) should be consolidated with AAFES (Army and Air Force Exchange Service). They are two separated organizations that do the exact same thing. I think that instead of NEX and AAFES being separate entities, they should be consolidated into one "Armed Forces Exchange Service".



At NAS JRB Fort Worth we inherited AAFES from Carswell Air Force Base. As the Commanding Officer I have jurisdiction over AAFES and I have noticed some things that are different in the way the operation is run. One of the major advantages is the way AAFES distributes their sales dividends.

The NEXs forward their dividends to the Navy Resale Service Support Organization (NRSSO). NRSSO then pools all the dividends from the various NEX stores throughout their system and redistributes them among their claimants, I assume with some deductions for administration costs. Once the individual NEXs get their share of the dividends, they turn it over to the base Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR) departments.

AAFES, on the other hand, keeps all the dividends at the local level and distributes it all to their local MWR department. To illustrate my point, NAS JRB Fort Worth has an AAFES and the two other JRBs have NEX stores. Our MWR Department gets more money from AAFES in five months than the other two JRBs combined get in a whole year, with roughly comparable sales revenues. And that does not take into account the time saved from all the administrative delays associated with the way NRSSO operates.

That is why I think the two systems should be merged into one Armed Forces Exchange system. I am sure there are also some things that the NEXs do better than the AAFES stores. When the systems are combined, we will get the best of both systems. The bottom line is that we will have a more efficient organization that will serve the customer better.

**Do you think with the success of JRBs there might be some JBs (Joint Bases) in the future?**

I do not think so, at least not in the near future. JRBs are easier to operate because we support the reserves and we draw them from the local area. By supporting Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, TANG reservists we are supporting the local population because that is where they come from. An "active duty" base would be harder to fathom because they tend to be more geographically scattered.

The active Navy Bases tend to be on the coasts near water, which differs with Army and Air Force locations. I do not think it is feasible to move one of the current active bases out of their geographic element.

**What are some possible threats of consolidation?**

There is a fear of job losses among the Civil Servants. The civilians suffer from what has been termed as the "Invasion of the Ations". In the recent times the civilians have come to fear words ending with "ation" because it always means cutbacks and lost jobs. Words such as privatization, consolidation, etc. They are scared and they have a valid point. Unfortunately anytime you trim the fat from any organization there are people who suffer the consequences, it just can't be helped.

**Do you have any other insights or views that I did not address?**

There are other ingredients to making a base successful other than what happens on base. The community that surrounds the base is a key to success. Here in Fort Worth we have gotten great support from the civilian community. They lost Carswell to base closures and they don't want to lose us. The civilian community has given us

overwhelming support. They donate money to all our organizations, write letters to Congress and sponsor many local events that honor the military. Without consolidating the services, this base would have been lost to the community. The fact is that consolidating the bases saves bases. By making a base multi-service you are making it more vital to the Nation and the more vital a base is, the more unlikely that it will be on the closure list. The community surrounding the base feels that sense of security and gives us their full support.

## **APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW WITH FORMER NAS JRB FORT WORTH CO**

A former CO of NAS JRB Fort Worth was E-Mailed some questions pertaining to inter-service support. The following are his responses.

- 1. Which support services aboard NAS JRB Fort Worth are consolidated among the different military services?**

Ans: Consolidated Security Forces, government vehicle maintenance, packing and crating, medical/dental to the extent they use the same facilities, and fuel farm operations.

- 2. Is the consolidation of the support services more efficient than each military service operating their own support service?**

Ans: Since each Service desires to operate a service in just a bit different fashion, the real efficiencies come from not having to have multiple facilities to operate a service. The biggest efficiency at Fort Worth comes from the combination of security forces and operation of the fuel farm by one contractor.

- 3. Does consolidating the support services among the military services improve the performance?**

- a. Yes: What do you think is the reason for better performance?

Ans: Yes, consolidation cuts down on the number of intermediate layers of management to get the job done. It does require buy in from the various Services and

trust that the one Service that operates the program will look out for everyone's needs equally.

b. No: What do you think is the reason for worse performance?

Ans: Interservice stove pipe rivalry of everyone going for the same dollar.

4. **In the consolidated departments, have the cultural differences of the different military services affected their working relationships.**

Ans: Not really, as you drill down in the instructions and operating procedures the biggest difference we have found is in semantics. We all do the job basically the same way but use different terminology.

5. **What are the strengths of consolidating the support service departments among the military services?**

Ans: The reduction of redundancy of the common services to save money. We want any savings to be plowed back into the purchase of parts/upgrades for hardware.

6. **What are some weaknesses of consolidating the support service departments among the military services?**

Ans: Overcoming inter-service rivalry.

7. **Does the consolidation of support services among the military services present any future opportunities?**

Ans: There is an opportunity to consolidate MWR, Family Service Center/Family Readiness and Public Works.

8. **What are some possible threats of consolidation? (i.e. perceived job loss for the civil service workers)**

Ans: Whenever you indicate you are planning to consolidate like services there is always the impression that the service provided will decline and that many people will lose their jobs. I have not yet seen this happen.

9. **Do you have any other insights or views on the consolidation of service departments among the military services that were not addressed?**

Ans: It is critical that the services work together wherever possible to consolidate like support functions under. This is but one way in which various components may be able to save money and redirect scarce funds into procurement of part/hardware and provide the resources necessary to pay the personnel.

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## **APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW WITH NAS JRB FORT WORTH SUPPLY OFFICER AND DEPUTY SUPPLY OFFICER**

The following interview was with the Station Supply Officer and the Deputy Supply Officer. Notes were taken, but responses are paraphrased for summary and presentation purposes. They were interviewed because many of the functions in their department are being looked at for possible consolidation. The divisions that are being looked at for consolidation are Aviation Fuels, Packing and Crating, and Contracting. There are separate interviews for each of these possible consolidations.

Prior to the start of the interview the Supply Officer had a few comments about the A-76 studies that seem ubiquitous among all military service departments today. (The A-76 study is a cost benefit analysis of the privatization of support functions that are currently being done with in-house resources.)

**Supply Officer:** I do not know why we spend so much time and resources fighting the A-76 study. I think privatization is a good thing. If the support services were privatized the civilians that are good would stay on and work for the private companies. There might be a few civil service workers that would lose their jobs but in most cases, to be perfectly frank, they are the ones that we would let go ourselves if we could. So to summarize what privatization would do for us it would:

- Be less service specific, thus more joint in nature
- Keep the good workers and dismiss the bad workers. And we would not get our hands dirty because the private firm would make the decisions
- Save us the time and resources that we devote to answering the grievances by the civilian workers. The ones that file the most grievances fit into the category that would be let go. The grievances that would still be filed would be filed with the private company and not with us. Some weeks I



seem to spend more time answering nonsense grievances that get dismissed right off the bat than my actual job of running the department.

I realize that I am going against the grain by making these statements but that is how I feel. When there is an A-76 study that is done on base we run around and do a lot of extra work trying to prove that we can do the job in-house better than a private firm. I say let them do their study and if they determine that the support service would be done better by the private sector then so be it.

After the Supply Officer gave his view on privatization, he and his deputy were asked questions about consolidation.

There is no delineation of who is responding nor are they quoted, all responses are paraphrased.

**Is the consolidation of the support services more efficient than each military service operating their own support service?**

Yes it would be if they could ever figure out how to go about having a truly joint operation. I am not sure that at this point it is possible to have a joint operation. Even in the Navy we can't seem to come to a consensus on how to do things among the different communities. As an example, the Navy Aviation community does things much different than the Navy Surface (Navy ships) community. If we could all sing off the same sheet of music it would be more efficient but we have a lot of work to do.

There should be some things that we should do prior to going "joint" on any base or support service. Those things are:

- Standardize the procedures among the Navy communities before we look outside of our service. We need to have the same procedures for the Submarine, Surface, and Aviation communities.

- Develop a standard operating procedure for all Services to follow. Do this by taking all the service procedures and use the most stringent rules and regulations from each one and combine them into one joint set of procedures. Doing this prior to any consolidation would make the consolidation so much smoother. The departments that are "joint" would not have to guess which service regulation to use.
- In order to do any of this, we need support from the top. The joint instructions and standards must come from the Pentagon level. We cannot write the instructions at this level and be effective. Some prime examples of areas that need to be standardized among the services are the logistics and finance operations. The service support systems could not communicate with each other without first standardizing these two areas.
- The key to everything is to find a common language to communicate among all military services. Once the language barrier is broken we can merge our support services. One way of developing a common language is by implementing common standard operating procedures.

**Do you feel that the cultural differences among the different military services affect their working relationships?**

The key is getting people to change their mindsets. I think a lot of the cultural differences can be overcome by developing a standard instruction among the Services. Once everyone is playing by the same rules the cultural differences will be minor. I think that the "cultural difference" is just a lame excuse for Services not wanting to work with each other. There will always be cultural differences, it is our job to overcome the differences and come together as a team. Each Service has a variety of people from many different cultures, we are not homogenous, but we still get the job done.

**What are some strengths associated with consolidating the support services among the military services?**

Once we consolidate the support services that are being performed separately there could be cost savings from the reduction of redundancy. By combining the

common functions and services we would spend less money on the base infrastructure and we could get the job done with less people, which would be a big savings.

From an operational standpoint it would be better too. If we work together on the peacetime support functions we will already be working together if we enter into a war or conflict. The command, control, and communications would be much stronger. So it is not just a matter of saving money by consolidating the support functions. If we consolidate wisely we will have a stronger national defense.

The bottom line is we will have less redundancy, which saves money and we will have better cooperation among the military services, which will make us stronger.

**What are some weaknesses associated with consolidating the support services among the military services?**

There will be fewer jobs with a more efficient consolidated service. That will cause some people to lose their jobs, that is bad but if we are going to make a more efficient system that is one of the things that we have to deal with. We can't have it both ways.

A big perception is that if the Services standardize their methods and move in the direction of consolidation, we might lose some of our Service identities and traditions. We will not lose our most valued traditions by consolidating our support services; that is an unjustified fear. Each service will maintain their unique traditions and heritage.

**Does the consolidation of support services among the military services present any future opportunities?**

Yes, there are opportunities to save money and become a stronger force. If we can work together at the support service level it could pave a path for services to work together at the operational level.

The one caveat to this is that any consolidation must be a top down process. Right now we have a bottom up approach. We are doing some consolidating of support services on this base but we are inventing the rules down here at our level and then submitting them up the chain of command. For the consolidation process to be effective, we must be directed from above not vice versa.

An example that we had on this base is the fuel farm. We worked very hard with the 301<sup>st</sup> Air Force Fighter Wing. We developed an instruction that would govern the consolidated fuels division. The plan was a good one, every aspect of the operation was covered, we consolidated the Navy and Air Force instructions by using the most stringent standards from each one. We developed a consolidated instruction after months of hard work by the senior members of both our fuels division and the Air Force's fuels division. We submitted the instruction up both chains and nothing happened. We got no support from above. We were able to submit the instruction well in advance for our fuels contract to be renewed but due to the non response from above we were forced to renew a million dollar contract with our fuels contractor. If we could have consolidated with the Air Force we could have saved all of the contract expense because the Air Force is operating right next to our fuels division doing the same thing we are doing. Our consolidation would have provided us with a huge opportunity to save money. This is why the consolidation decision must come from the top down.

**What are some possible threats of consolidation?**

The largest threat of consolidation is the probable job losses for our civilian workers. As I have stated before that is just one of the things that we are going to have to live with. I am sorry that people will lose their jobs but if we are going to streamline our operations, there will be some job losses and there is nothing we can do about that.

**Do you have any other insights or views on the consolidation of support service departments among the military services that were not addressed?**

No, I think I sidetracked enough during the other questions to cover any other ideas that I have.

## **APPENDIX D. INTERVIEW WITH NAVY SUPPLY CORPS COMMANDER (O-5)**

The following is an interview with a Commander (O-5) in the Navy Supply Corps. He was the Deputy Supply Officer on NAS JRB Fort Worth at the time of the inception of the base (Plank Owner). He was involved with that process that was supposed to have consolidated the Packing and Crating between the Air Force and the Navy. Notes were taken, but responses are paraphrased for summary and presentation purposes.

**Is the consolidation of support services more efficient than each military Service operating their own support service?**

Yes, it is much more efficient but there are some glitches that must be addressed for the system to be a success.

The largest obstacle that we must work around is the question of whose standards are we to operate by? Each Service has their own standards and operating procedures. When we consolidate support services it must be determined which standards to use, otherwise there will be no organization and that would defeat the purpose of trying to become more efficient. We need to have consolidated instructions from above. We need DOD instructions or Standard Operating Procedures to guide us.

Another problem that might arise is the question of which Service takes the lead. It must be spelled out exactly which service is in charge and which one is subordinate prior to any consolidation. Without that guidance nothing could get done, at least efficiently.

You must also look at the deployable forces on base. You could grow to depend on equipment or critical skills of personnel that are in a deployable status. i.e. (hypothetically speaking) The Air Force has a K-loader that supports the base. The base becomes dependent on that piece of equipment and has a "lazy reliance" on that gear. When the Air Force Air Wing deploys they take the K-loader with them and suddenly the station is short one K-loader. In this case the station should have a redundancy built into its support system so there is not a "lazy reliance" on a deployable asset.

The consolidation of resources will make us more efficient when the unit is not deployed but without a built in redundancy it could make us come to a virtual halt when they do deploy.

**Does consolidating the support services among the military services improve the performance?**

Yes it can but as I said earlier, we need a standard system to work from. We tend to be our own worst enemy. You need to know which system to work from to become more effective as a department. To do that you must have a standard instruction.

It would be best if it were a DOD instruction that spelled out the specific duties of all the Services involved. If there is no DOD instruction then a local instruction could be used but all the services involved would have to work together to come up with joint operating procedures.

**Are there any cultural considerations that might get in the way of consolidation?**

Yes there are. They can be overcome but there are some cultural differences that must be addressed. Before we try to overcome the cultural differences between Services we must solve our cultural differences within the Navy. The land and sea based units have different ways of doing things. We need to get on standardized systems throughout the Navy before we try to standardize with other Services.

There is a cultural difference between the Navy and Air Force personnel on Quality of Life. That affects the support services. An example is berthing. An Air Force enlisted person is entitled by Air Force regulations to have a private BEQ (Bachelor Enlisted Quarters) room and Navy enlisted personnel below the grade of E-7 must double up on rooms. That was an issue when I left the base, I do not know how or if they solved that situation. That is just one example where a joint instruction that standardizes berthing policies for the entire DOD would solve the situation.

Without the instruction from above you are going to have Inter-Service squabbles that might not be solvable at the base level.

At NAS JRB Fort Worth we had to overcome the resentment of the Air Force personnel that stayed behind because the Navy took over their base. They changed status from being the base owner to being a base tenant. I can understand why they could resent that. We can call this base a Joint Reserve Base but when you have it titled as "NAS" and have a Navy Commanding Officer that never rotates to the other Services, it is not really joint.

**When you were the Deputy Supply Officer at NAS JRB Fort Worth there was an effort to consolidate the Navy and Air Force Packing and Crating (P&C). That never materialized. Could you tell me what happened?**



When the Navy Supply Department moved onto the base the Air Force P&C was in a hangar that the Navy wanted for operational use. Someone came up with the idea to consolidate the P&C of the Navy and Air Force. It made sense and it was approved.

The Air Force P&C moved in alongside the Navy P&C with the idea that the two would consolidate over time. The problem was that no one was held accountable. The Air Force had solved their problem by putting a roof over their P&C operation and the Navy packers did not want to change anything they were doing. What was supposed to be a consolidated operation ended up as two separate operations working along side each other.

Whenever the idea of consolidation was brought up to Air Force leaders they did not want to discuss it. The Air Force leadership had hard feelings because there was supposedly some MOA (Memorandum of Agreement) that the Navy did not live up to dealing with space compensation for the Hangar that the Air Force gave up.

The real problem, although nobody said it out loud was control. No one had any incentive to cooperate for the following reasons:

- There was no direction from above
- No one was held accountable at the base level
- Without direction from above neither the Navy nor the Air Force was given the lead on the project
- Without anyone in charge the consolidation never materialized
- Neither service wanted to give up their control over their own P&C operation
- There was a perception that if one Service were in charge of a consolidated operation, the other Service's priorities would become secondary

- On the worker level (all Civil Servants) there was a fear that consolidation would eliminate some of their jobs. Therefore they had an incentive to not consolidate

These are justifiable concerns because there was no instruction from above. The ambiguity of the situation could have been avoided if the following things were done:

- Prior to moving the two operations together, there should be a clear plan. The plan should contain:
  - Joint Operating Procedures (JOP), written at the JCS level. (Big one)
  - Clear definition of which Service is going to take the lead and which is subordinate. Someone has to be in charge
  - Once a Service is put in charge, hold them accountable for organizing and running the operations. Deadlines must be put into place and then enforced
  - In a truly joint operation there should be a plan to rotate the responsibility

If we could have done that in P&C I think it could have been a successful merger.

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## **APPENDIX E. INTERVIEW WITH THE NAS JRB FORT WORTH BASE POLICE CHIEF AND ASSISTANT CHIEF**

The following is an interview with the Chief of Police and the Assistant Chief of Police of NAS JRB Fort Worth. The Chief is an Air Force GS-12 and the Assistant Chief is a Navy Active Duty Senior Chief (E-8). Notes were taken, but responses are paraphrased for summary and presentation purposes.

The NAS JRB Fort Worth Base Police Department is comprised of the following full time members:

Air Force Civilian	23
Navy Civilian	15
Navy Active Duty/TAR*	86
TANG**	12

\* TAR is the acronym for Training and Administration of Reserves. They are full time active duty with a primary mission of training reservists.

\*\* TANG full time support.

\*\*\* Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Reservists also augment the force on Reserve weekends.

**Is the consolidation of support services more efficient then each military service operating their own support service?**

Yes, it is much more efficient. It lets us operate all of our forces under one roof. We have Navy active duty, Reservists and civilians; Air Force Reservists, and civilians; TANG full time support; and Marine Reservists.

There is no separation of duties by Service. We all work together. We rotate everyone through the various jobs such as gate guard, security patrol and aircraft security regardless of what branch of Service they are in. If we were to operate separately as they do on other bases it would be a waste of valuable resources because there would be a lot of redundancy.

There are no turf battles on this base because we all work together. That is not the case on bases that have separate Services operating separate Police Departments. For example, at NAS Atlanta they have both Navy and Air Force personnel on base. Both have their own Police Departments and they actually have what I call turf wars. Believe it or not, if a Navy Police Officer goes over to the Air Force side of the base they get arrested and vice versa for the Air Force Police Officer that wanders over to the Navy side. That is not only a waste of time and resources, it is stupid.

**Does consolidating the support services among the military services improve the performance?**

Yes, the performance is improved. Each Service gets cross-trained in the way in which the other Services operate. That makes us more proficient operating as one unit that can handle any situation from any Service. The alternative is to have multiple Base Police Departments that can only handle Service specific situations.

The problem is that no one above the base level has signed on to the concept of a consolidated Base Police Department. We all get along fine at this level but as you go up the chain it gets more difficult. The reason we created some local instructions is that we got tired of waiting for a consolidated instruction from above. We are doing fine but some support from above could have saved some growing pains. If there is any future in

consolidating Base Police Departments on other installations there is going to have to be more cooperation from above.

**In your department, under consolidation, have cultural differences of the different military services affected their working relationships?**

There are no great cultural differences per se because when it comes down to it we are all Police Officers regardless of which branch of Service we are in. The bond between Police Officers is stronger than the Service differences.

The big difference that we have had to overcome in our 6 years of operation is that each Service has its own specific instructions. We have some local instructions that we have written up using the most stringent standards from each Service and combining them into one instruction. We are still waiting for a consolidated DOD instruction from the upper level leaders, way above the base level.

Another factor is that we have two distinct budlines (Budget Lines of accounting – i.e.: funding). We buy different equipment from the budgets, Navy squad cars must be marked as Navy and the same with Air Force vehicles. We do interchange the equipment on the cars though.

From our point of view, having two budlines is not necessarily a bad thing. We decide how we want to spend the money based on our department needs. It does not matter which funds we use. We just have to ensure we use the right accounting methods since the accounting systems of the Navy and Air Force are different.

From a selfish standpoint we get a bigger budget having two budlines to feed from. But the argument could be made that a consolidated budget would save money.

**What are the strengths of consolidating the Base Police Department among the military services?**

There are several strengths of consolidating the Base Police Department. I am sure there are more strengths than I can think of right now but the ones that I consider most important are:

- There are no turf battles between the different Military Branches of service
- We get a better economical use of our resources such as equipment, manpower and money
- We have better Interservice relationships
- We are constantly learning new ways and techniques from each other
- We are instilling an esprit de corps among the different Services. In the long run it will foster better cooperation and communication between the different branches of Service

**What are some weaknesses of consolidating the support service departments among the military Services?**

There are no real weaknesses that I can think of at the local level. The weakness for the program is that we have no support from above. There is no official instruction that states how we should operate above the command level.

We got tired of waiting for a DOD instruction so we wrote some local instructions. We took the Navy SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) and the Air Force OIs (Operating Instructions) and merged them into what we have titled JSOPs (Joint Standard Operating Procedures). In order to do this, we used the strictest standards from both Service instructions and combined them into local JSOPs.

There has been no edict from above to do a combined instruction; we did it on our own at the base level, through the Commanding Officer of course. We never get

anything from above; it seems that the top leaders are waiting to see if consolidation works before they commit to it.

**Does the consolidation of Base Police Departments among the Military services present any future opportunities?**

Yes, it is a good idea. Consolidation reduces administrative costs and reduces the required number of personnel to accomplish the same job. Once we prove that consolidation is a good thing in our department it can spread to other support service departments.

On a bigger level it helps the whole joint base concept become more credible once we prove we can do it on a department level.

**What are some possible threats of consolidation?**

The primary threat from consolidation or any streamlining project that is aimed at saving money is the loss of jobs. The civilians lose their jobs and the military loses billets. That may be a hard thing to take but it is necessary if we want to achieve our goal of a more efficient department through consolidation. Let's face it, consolidation is the wave of the future and you must take the bad things that come along with any progress.

**Do you have any other insights or views on the consolidation of support service departments among the military Services that were not addressed?**

I can give you my take on the consolidation. It is, as I said the wave of the future. But there are a few things that must happen to make it work. Those things are:

- We must develop a hierarchy within the DOD that supports consolidation
- DOD must write "joint" instructions that apply to everyone



- Use the successful consolidations as an example to guide other departments in their implementation
- Get rid of the "us verses them" attitude among the Services and work as one joint team
- Ensure that you have a large enough facility to consolidate the military Services

The key is to create a top down design and go from there. We need the upper joint echelon to lead the way. Consolidation of support services such as the Base Police Department might seem like small potatoes up at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level but it is not. Consolidating the support activities will develop better cooperation and communication among the Services and that could expand into operational areas and make our national defense a stronger more flexible operation.

## **APPENDIX F. INTERVIEW WITH BASE POLICE PATROL PERSONNEL**

The following is an interview with two Base Police Patrol Officers, one TANG and the other U.S. Navy. Both of the Patrol Officers (PO) were paygrade E-5. They both wore camouflage uniforms. The only service distinction on their uniforms was the embroidery above the left breast pocket, i.e. U.S. Navy or USAF (TANG). Please see the interview conducted with the Chief of Police and his assistant for the exact composition of the department. Notes were taken, but responses are paraphrased for summary and presentation purposes.

**Is the consolidation of the Base Police Department more efficient than each military service operating their own support service?**

**TANG P.O.:** Yes, we are able to get more done with less people. I think they are using us better than if each service patrolled their own area.

**Navy P.O.:** I agree, when we work together each service knows what the other service is doing and that avoids the situation of a Navy Patrol Officer doing the same thing that a TANG Patrol Officer is doing.

**Does the consolidation of the Base Police Department improve the performance?**

**TANG P.O.:** Yes, I think so. At first it was hard to get used to working with the Navy guys, just because it was a different experience but when you think of it, we were doing the same basic job and there was no reason not to consolidate.

**Navy P.O.:** I think it is better that we are working together. I think that working as one department, regardless of our Service, gets rid of the "us verses them" attitude and makes us one big team. I think that improves our work ethic and our performance.

**Have the cultural differences of the different military services affected your working relationships.**

**TANG P.O.:** No, not in the long run. When we were first combined, I think we were suspicious of each other and the fact that each Service had their own regulations did not help. We all had the attitude that, our way is the right way and your way is the wrong way. When we sat down and looked at the differences, we realized that we were more the same than we were different. The base has joint instructions for us to follow now and that helps because we are now all reading off the same page, so to speak. I think it is easier for TANG because we do not rotate. This is my job until I decide I want to rotate or quit. We wear a uniform and get the benefits and pay of the military paygrade but we are actually state employees, similar to GS workers. The Navy people rotate, so we get new people who have to adjust to the new methods while the TANG people are already adjusted.

**Navy P.O.:** I don't think that in any Service cultural differences really get in the way. My colleague is right; when we first get here we are a little apprehensive of doing something new. It helps that there are people here that already have a handle on working together. I rotated into here when the system was already set up and running so it was easier for me. I admire the original people that were here when the joint base was first stood up; they had to pave the way for us.

**What are the strengths of consolidating the support service departments among the military services?**

**TANG P.O.:** I think the main strength is the cooperation among the services allows us to use our personnel and resources better. We have proven that we can do it better for cheaper. The other main strength is working together makes us less rivals and we learn a lot from each other. I think that is important.

**Navy P.O.:** I really do not have much to add, my colleague covered it for me, and I am in complete agreement.

**What are some weaknesses of consolidating the support service departments among the military services?**

**TANG P.O.:** I really can't think of any, once you get by the odd senses of humor that these Navy guys have, it isn't so bad.

**Navy P.O.:** I concur.

**Does the consolidation of support services among the military services present any future opportunities?**

**TANG P.O.:** Yes, I think if we prove we can work together it can be done in other departments on base. I think in time all the support services on bases with more than one service will be operated jointly.

**Navy P.O.:** I agree and to take it one step further, once the services realize they can work together at this level, top level leaders might imitate us. That would make us a much stronger joint force in the time of war or other emergency situations.

**What are some possible threats of consolidation? (i.e. perceived job loss for the civil service workers)**

**TANG P.O.:** Anytime we talk of becoming more efficient, there is always a possibility of people losing their jobs. It did not happen here. TANG personnel are really civilians in uniform but we have not lost any jobs.

**Navy P.O.:** I do not think there are any big threats of job loss in our field but it might be different in other departments. If you consolidate the department to reduce redundancy, you will probably reduce the number of workers that you need. That is a fact of life; it may cause some people to have to walk out the door sooner than they anticipated, that is unfortunate but it is something we can't avoid in the times of decreasing military budgets.

**Do you have any other insights or views on the consolidation of service departments among the military services that were not addressed?**

**TANG P.O.:** I do not have much to add, just that I am glad we consolidated, I have learned so much from this experience. I think it has not only made us a better department, I know it has made me a better patrol officer.

**Navy P.O.:** I could not have said it better. I have gained so much from working with the other Services and I will take that to my future duty stations.

## **APPENDIX G. INTERVIEW WITH NAS JRB FORT WORTH FUELS OFFICER**

The following is an interview with the Fuels Officer of NAS JRB Fort Worth. The Fuels Officer is an Aviation Boswains's Mate (Fuels) Chief Petty Officer (ABFC). The Chief is Regular Navy serving on a Reserve Base. Notes were taken, but responses are paraphrased for summary and presentation purposes.

**Background:** NAS JRB Fort Worth has the largest Aviation Fuels operations of any reserve installation.

**Installation:** The Aviation Fuels operation, known as the Fuel Farm, is controlled by the Navy and ran by the Navy Fuels Officer. There are 2 Navy enlisted ABFs to assist the Fuels Officer. The Fuel Farm maintenance is contracted.

**Fuel Delivery (to flight line):** The Navy uses the same contractor to deliver their fuel as they use to do the maintenance. The contractor owns the fuel delivery trucks. The overall contract is 1 million dollars per year. The Air Force and TANG own their fuel trucks and deliver their own fuel.

**Consolidation:** The Fuels Division has been looked at for possible consolidation. The Navy and Air Force Fuels Officers conducted a joint study. As part of the study the two Fuels Officers produced a joint instruction that encompassed the most stringent regulations of the Navy and Air Force aviation fueling regulations. The study, along with the instruction was passed up the chain of command. It stalled somewhere in an upper echelon in-basket. It has been over a year and nothing has been heard about consolidation from above.

**Would the consolidation of the Fuel support services improve the efficiency of your fuels operation?**

Yes, It would cut down on the redundancy of having three services doing the same thing. Right now the Air Force fuels Air Force planes, TANG fuels TANG planes, and the Navy fuels Navy, Marine Corps and transient aircraft. There is no reason that we could not consolidate. If we consolidate we could eliminate the need for contracted fuel delivery and cut down on the number of delivery trucks required. It would save a lot of money. At present the number of delivery trucks for each service is as follows:

Navy	6 (Owned by Contractor)
Air Force	5
TANG	<u>4</u>
Total	<u>15</u>

Estimated Trucks required after consolidation: 9

The consolidation would also require the hiring of 5 personnel or increasing the military compliment by 5 or a combination of both. Those personnel would replace 10 personnel (contract).

**Would consolidating the Fuel support services among the military services improve the performance?**

The performance should not change significantly. We would aim for a seamless transition that would be invisible to the customer. Our service is very good right now but we could maintain our high level of service and save a lot of money under consolidation.

**In the Fuels support service, under consolidation, would cultural differences of the different military services affect working relationships?**

No, cultural differences would not get in the way. We may be of different Services but we are all fuel people. There is a standard language in the fuels area that transcends military boundaries. Sometimes I can communicate better with an Air Force fueler than I can with a Navy non-fueler.

The thing that we do need is a single instruction for all Air Force, TANG, and Navy fueling operations. We wrote an instruction for this base that was a compilation of the Navy and Air Force standard operation procedures by taking the most stringent rules of each service and making it one joint instruction. Our instruction that we worked very hard on stalled somewhere up the chain of command. What has to happen is that the instruction should be written at the DOD level.

**What are the possible strengths of consolidating the Fuels support service among the military services?**

There are two large strengths of consolidation. First, it saves a lot of money and resources. Second, it will help us establish long term working relationships with the other services, and that will help us in the time of conflict or war.

**What are some weaknesses of consolidating the support service departments among the military services?**

There will be a reduction in the amount of personnel that are required to run the fuels operation. The people that are lost will be contracted personnel but they are still people not just numbers.



**Would consolidation present any future opportunities?**

The complete unification of the shore fuels would present the opportunity for great savings through elimination of redundancies. It would be a little harder to get the fuel operations that are aboard ships to consolidate with the other services but it could be done over time.

**What are some possible threats of consolidation?**

The same as was said for weaknesses, possible job losses.

**I understand that consolidation was considered for the fuels operations on this base but you are still running separate operations. What happened?**

In March of 1999 we were tasked with performing a study that would determine how much money was spent on this base as compared to other bases for aviation fuels operations. The idea was to see if we were competitive with the other bases with our contract costs. The study showed that we were. Then the following things happened:

- We were given the assignment to see if there could be any savings from consolidating our operations with the Air Force
- We completed the study. The study showed that considerable savings could be realized if we consolidated our operations
- In anticipation of the consolidation, we wrote Joint Navy/Air Force Aviation Fuel instructions
- We passed the study and the Joint Instructions up the chain
- We still have not got any feedback back from our submission and it has been well over a year

We worked through the specifics with the Air Force and it looked like it could work. In the end we did not get any support from either the Navy or the Air Force chain of command above the base.

In the meantime the Navy fuels contract expired. There was enough time to get the consolidation into place and save a lot of money but that did not happen. We were not even close to getting our consolidation in order so we ended up renewing a five year contract for a million dollars a year.

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## **APPENDIX H. INTERVIEW WITH NAS JRB FORT WORTH CONTRACTING DIVISION OFFICER**

The following is an interview with the Contracting Division Officer. The Contracting Officer is a Civilian GS-11, and he is in charge of all contracting and purchasing and management of the Government Credit Card for the Navy. The Air Force and TANG operate separate Purchasing Departments. Notes were taken, but responses are paraphrased for summary and presentation purposes.

### **Has the Contracting function on this base been considered?**

Yes, there was an A-76 study conducted. As of right now, there are separate contracting departments for the Navy/Marine Corps, TANG (Texas Air National Guard), and the Air Force. The Army also has their own contracting department but they are not on base yet.

We are putting a proposal together. It looks promising for a future joint contracting department on this base. I think it will happen. It is just a question of when it will happen.

In contracting we all perform the same work. Most of the guidance comes from the FAR (Federal Acquisition Regulations) and the DFARS (Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement). Each service supplements the two regulation manuals with their own instructions. The Navy has NAVSUP (Navy Supply) instructions and the Air Force also has service specific instructions. We want to have one Contracting Officer on base in charge of the whole program.

**Is the consolidation of support services more efficient then each military service operating their own support service?**

Yes, it is more efficient. Contracting would become more efficient because you would eliminate the redundancy of the different Contracting Officers doing the same job in separate locations.

I have an example. On this base we have put in a LAN to support our IT system. The LAN contract for the base could have been simple. The contract should have covered everyone on the base; we could all share the same LAN line. But it did not happen that way. Each service wanted a separate LAN line. Each Service set up separate contracts. First the Navy had their line put in, the base was dug up and a lot of streets were closed at one time or another. That was not bad because it is necessary but less than a year later the Air Force came through with their contract and dug up the same streets. They laid their LAN lines right next to the Navy lines. And now TANG is about to start the same process. If there was a consolidated contracting office this situation probably would not have happened.

There could have been one line and one contract. It would have saved millions of dollars and also lessen the frustration that everyone has when they start closing streets and posting detours. The money saved by consolidation could be used elsewhere on Quality of Life issues.

**Does consolidating the support services among the military services improve the performance?**

Yes, consolidation will not only make us more efficient, it will also help us do the job better. One Contracting Officer supporting all Services is better than separate Contracting Officers for each Service. The cross training will make us more versatile. About 75% of performance is attitude. When we see we can be more efficient at our jobs then we will start to feel better about ourselves. Once we feel better about ourselves, our attitudes get better and our performance is enhanced. Give people reason to take pride in their jobs and they can accomplish just about anything.

**In your department, under consolidation, have cultural differences of the different military services affected their working relationships?**

Yes, it can be a challenge to overcome. The Navy and Air Force have distinct different cultures. The Navy goes to Sea and the Air Force does not. I am in the Air Force Reserves and I work for the Navy so I can see the differences first hand. On the other hand, I think I am a prime example of how one can overcome the cultural differences.

The Navy is not a homogenous organization; there are different cultures and backgrounds among the Sailors. The Navy has operated effectively for many years with diverse cultures. That shows that people can work together effectively despite of coming from different cultures.

**What are the strengths of consolidating the Contracting Division among the military services?**

The major strength or advantage is the continuity. Each Contracting Officer would be cross trained in the methods of the other services. The ability to specialize in

several areas would increase. An example outside of contracting is the training of pilots. Why can't the Navy and Air Force consolidate their training? Teach them to fly. The Navy pilots could learn the Air Force techniques and the Air Force could learn how the Navy does things.

The result is that the nation will have pilots highly skilled in multiple areas. An Air Force pilot would be able to land on an aircraft carrier.

**What are some weaknesses of consolidating the support service departments among the military services?**

A possible weakness could be the separation of responsibility and authority. Someone has to be in charge. There has to be someone in charge who must be held accountable for the operation. It would not work if there were someone from both services working together on equal grounds. There must be a clear accountable person or it will not work. That can tend to hurt feelings if someone is in charge of a department and the next thing he knows he is working for someone else. But that is life, if you want to make an omelet, you must break a few eggs. I think that it may take a few rotations of personnel to accept the changes if they are military.

If they are GS civilians they can live with the change or look for work elsewhere. I am a GS and if I were put under that Air Force Contracting Officer I would not necessarily like it. In my case I would just look at the big picture and realize it is a necessary change and it is best for everyone in the long run. The key is to educate and inform the affected personnel. That is about the only weakness that I can foresee. Consolidation is mostly good.

**Does the consolidation of Support Services among the Military services present any future opportunities?**

Yes, especially in contracting. As I said before, we can become so much better if all the services work together. The support service personnel can be used for any service. We can cross train our personnel and gain a better trained more efficient force. An added benefit is that if we work together at this level we can also work together operationally.

**What are some possible threats of consolidation?**

The threat is the perception of job security. The civil service work force perceives that consolidation will mean fewer jobs. Unfortunately they are correct. A leaner more efficient force will decrease the number of jobs for the civilians and also decrease the number of billets for the active duty military. That is something we have to live with. Over time as we have improved technology we have been able to accomplish tasks with fewer resources and sometimes those reduced resources are human resources.

On the other hand, if we educate our personnel about the advantages of consolidation it will lessen the perception of reduced job security. Once the personnel realize that being cross-trained will make them more versatile and valuable they will have a better attitude.

**Do you have any other insights or views on the consolidation of support service departments among the military services that were not addressed?**

No, I think we covered it.



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## **APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW WITH CHIEF DISPATCHER FOR TANG TRANSPORTATION**

The following is an interview with the TANG Chief Dispatcher for transportation. The individual interviewed was a TANG Technical Sergeant (E-6) with 33 years of service. Notes were taken, but responses are paraphrased for summary and presentation purposes.

**Does the consolidation of the Transportation Department on this base make it more efficient than each service running their own Transportation Departments?**

We are not consolidated. We are just co-located. The only thing that we have in common with the Navy is that we work out of the same building. We can't become consolidated because we have separate vehicles. The TANG vehicles are owned by the state of Texas and the federal government owns the Navy vehicles.

Consolidation of the transportation department would not be a good idea. Each service has their own mechanics and they operate from different specifications. For example, the Navy does not have refueling trucks so how would you expect them to have their mechanics work on them.

The Navy just does things different and I would not want any part of it. I do not want to become partners with the Navy. We get much better equipment. Our vehicles are brand new and when we are through with them we mark them for DRMO (Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office – Formerly known as Salvage). The Navy usually grabs the vehicles that we have marked for DRMO. I mean no disrespect but I do not want to become like that.

**Do you see any strengths that might come from consolidation?**

No, I do not see any strengths that could come from consolidation. Maybe we could cooperate some with each other. For instance, the Navy can haul civilians around in their vehicles. I think they have a youth organization called the Sea Cadets. The TANG or Air Force can't do that; we can only haul military personnel. We could work together and have them haul all civilian groups but we (TANG) will never haul civilians so consolidation of the department does not make sense.

**Other than the things we have talked about are there any threats you can think of that would be brought about by consolidation?**

There would be job losses. The Navy does not understand the TANG system. I wear a uniform to work and I am an E-6 and I am proud of my uniform but as a TANG employee, I am equivalent to a GS worker. If the Navy loses billets they can cut their civilian employees but the only thing that happens to their military members is possibly transferring. But TANG employees that are in uniform can lose their jobs. Job reduction is a major threat to us, I have had the same job for 33 years and I am happy with the way things are.

**Do you think there are any cultural barriers to consolidation?**

Yes, definitely. That is another big reason that I do not think consolidation could work. The Air Force and TANG are young services; we do not have any deep imbedded traditions yet. The Navy is extremely tradition conscious. They have what, 200 or 300 years of history. I do not like what I see of their traditions. They focus too much on rank.

**Do you have any overall thoughts on consolidation?**

We have a system right now that works well. We share the same building but that is it. We could not and should not be consolidated, it just would not work. TANG mechanics have a great record. We consistently average about a 95% "vehicle up" rate. The Navy, due to a lack of funding, trained personnel, etc are a lot less than that. I do not know the exact numbers but it is lower than TANG. There is just no incentive for TANG to merge with the Navy, even if we could. We have a great system and I do not think that consolidation will improve it.

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## **APPENDIX J. INTERVIEW WITH ADMIN DEPARTMENT SENIOR CHIEF (E-8)**

The following passage is a short conversation with the station senior Yeoman (YNCS). It was just a passing conversation but the Senior Chief brought up some good points of interest. Notes were taken, but responses are paraphrased for summary and presentation purposes.

The subject of this thesis came up and the Senior Chief told me that the Identification Card (ID) offices of the Navy and the Air Force were looked at for consolidation.

This is a perfect operation to consolidate since the ID card offices work from a DOD instruction. Any service has the equipment to do the ID cards of any other service since the ID network is interconnected among the services. On NAS JRB Fort Worth there are two separate ID card issuing offices operated by the Navy and Air Force that do the exact same function. There are two separate locations; each having their own staffs doing identical work.

Everything was in place to merge the two offices into a central location. The 301<sup>st</sup> Air Wing just needed to get it approved up their chain of command. Unfortunately the Upper echelon of the Air Force did not approve it. The reason given was that the person who does ID work for the Air Force does other jobs for them also. It was determined that it would improve Air Force operations by sending one of their employees and the ID card machine to the Navy to consolidate the service. The Navy leadership on NAS JRB Fort Worth said, no problem, send us the hardware and we will do everything

ourselves. We will do Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Army. In the long run it did not work out because neither Service was willing to give up control of their ID card service.

So that was it, we are wasting time and money because nobody wants to give up control. I thought of suggesting that they take our machines and do all the ID card but we did not want to give up control either.

## **APPENDIX K. INTERVIEW WITH NAVY SELECTED RESERVIST**

This is the perspective of a Navy Reserve Lieutenant (O-3). Since the JRB is designed to support the reservists, it is important to get their point of view on how well the system is working. The limitation of an interview of just one reservist is noted.

**Is the consolidation of support services more efficient than each military service operating their own support service?**

Yes.

**Explain your answer.**

The stand-up of Carswell Air Force Base as a Joint Reserve Base has been a positive move in my experience. Perhaps it is economically efficient for the government to construct one facility and have the four or more uniformed services share it than to build four or more separate locations of the same type of support facility. The new facilities were certainly needed. Either way, I believe that support services have been streamlined based upon my past experience. Specifically:

**Medical.** The new clinic at JRB is a fine facility - much better than the one that we had at NAS Dallas. The service was professional and comparable to any civilian clinic. I would think that the investment in state of the art equipment for use by all services would be a more efficient than separate facilities with incomplete/obsolete capital equipment.



**MWR.** I don't utilize these services that often (an occasional purchase at the BX or commissary), however I believe that having these facilities at a JRB provides these services more efficiently for the same reasons mentioned above.

**PSD.** These offices were closed down at both at NAS Dallas and JRB. That was a good move from my perspective. I haven't missed them. It is now easier to access/update service records at the RESCEN. I have noticed no real problems with disbursements as a result. To the best of my knowledge, this area of support service has not been consolidated with the other services. If it has, then it is a good move from my perspective.

**Other.** My particular unit, an SSB Fuels Company, is responsible for fueling aircraft and vehicles from all branches of the service. We have been trained to operate the assets that belong to the other branches as well. Being at JRB allows us to work with other these branches of the military and keeps our unit mobilization readiness high.

**Do you think the Reserves get better support through consolidated support services?**

Yes.

**Explain your answer.**

I have really been pleased with the aforementioned support given to us at JRB. The support service seems to have improved since our relocation to JRB. I don't know if this is attributable to consolidation or not. If so, then my answer is definitely "yes". The speed, efficiency, and professionalism with which these services are rendered is markedly improved from my experience at NAS Dallas.

## APPENDIX L. INTERVIEW QUESTION BANK

1. Which support services aboard NAS JRB Fort Worth are consolidated among the different military services?
2. Is the consolidation of the support services more efficient than each military Service operating their own support service?
3. Does consolidating the support services among the military services improve the performance?
  - a. Yes: What do you think is the reason for better performance?
  - b. No: What do you think is the reason for worse performance?
4. In the consolidated departments, have the cultural differences of the different military services affected their working relationships.
  - If yes: How so?
5. What are the strengths of consolidating the support service departments among the military services?
6. What are some weaknesses of consolidating the support service departments among the military services?
7. Does the consolidation of support services among the military services present any future opportunities?
8. What are some possible threats of consolidation? (i.e. perceived job loss for the civil service workers)
9. Do you have any other insights or views on the consolidation of service departments among the military services that were not addressed?

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 Naval Postgraduate School  
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 Monterey, CA 93943-5101
  
3. Chairman, Code SBPP .....1  
 Graduate School of Business and Public Policy  
 Naval Postgraduate School  
 Monterey, CA 93943-5121
  
4. Professor Cary Simon, Code SBPP/SN .....2  
 Graduate School of Business and Public Policy  
 Naval Postgraduate School  
 Monterey, CA 93943-5121
  
5. Professor Ira Lewis, Code SBPP/LE .....2  
 Graduate School of Business and Public Policy  
 Naval Postgraduate School  
 Monterey, CA 93943-5121
  
6. Commanding Officer .....1  
 NAS JRB Fort Worth  
 Fort Worth, Texas 76127
  
7. Supply Officer.....1  
 NAS JRB Fort Worth  
 Fort Worth, Texas 76127
  
8. LCDR Jeffrey M. Post .....2  
 229 S. Regis Road  
 Saukville, Wisconsin 53080